

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SAIGON 01170 310628Z

12

ACTION EA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 SP-02 PM-03 INR-07

CIAE-00 DODE-00 RSC-01 /039 W  
----- 107075

R 310342Z JAN 75

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2357

USDEL JEC PARIS

COMUSSAG NKP THAILAND

CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

COMIPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAIGON 01170

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS, VS

SUBJECT: CONVERSATIONS WITH CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT  
COMMANDER AND GIA DINH PROVINCE CHIEF ABOUT  
SAIGON AREA

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION AMEMBASSY SAIGON FROM AMCONSUL BIEN HOA  
29 JAN 75 BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFORMATION

QUOTE BIEN HOA 067

LIMDIS

1. THIS MESSAGE SETS FORTH THE MAIN POINTS OF INTEREST IN MY  
CONVERSATIONS JAN 29 WITH CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT COMMANDER,  
ADMIRAL CHUNG DAN CANG, AND GIA DINH PROVINCE CHIEF, COLONEL C AU  
VAN TIEN.

2. ADMIRAL CANG SPOKE FIRST OF THE CURRENT ANTI-SAPPER SWEEP  
OPERATION IN THE GIA DINH/HAU NGHIA/LONG AN BORDER AREA INVOLVING  
ONE RF BN FROM EACH OF THE 3 PROVINCES. IN ENGAGEMENTS JAN 28  
SOME 18 KMS WEST OF SAIGON JUST INSIDE THE HAU NGHIA BORDER, THE  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SAIGON 01170 310628Z

RF IN THIS ACTION HAD KILLED 15 NVA/VC IN DESTROYING A CAMP WHICH

CANG THOUGHT PROBABLY WAS THE 117TH SAPPER BATTALION HQS. THAT AREA WAS BEING SWEEPED ON THE BASIS OF A RALLIER'S DECLARATION THAT HIS UNIT (THE 117TH) RECEIVED A MESSAGE TO PREPARE FOR THE RECEIPT OF 300 TONS REPEAT 300 TONS OF AMMUNITION THROUGH THE TRI-BORDER AREA IN THE CURRENT PERIOD. THE SWEEP OPERATION HAD NOT YET UNCOVERED THE SUPPLY/AMMO DUMP BEING SEARCHED FOR.

3. CANG THOUGHT THE NVA/VC WILL TRY TO STEP UP ACTIVITY IN THE CAPITAL AREA IN FEBRUARY. HE DESCRIBED RECENT INTELLIGENCE (OF WHICH WE WERE PREVIOUSLY UNAWARE IN BIEN HOA) THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAD DIVIDED THEIR 1974/75 DRY SEASON CAMPAIGN INTO THREE PHASES: NOV 23 TO DEC 22, DEC 23 TO FEB 2, FEB 3 TO JUNE 6. CANG SAID THAT THE LONG THIRD PHASE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE THE TOUGHEST AND ITS LONG DURATION WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE COSVN INTENTION TO CARRY OUT MORE SUSTAINED ATTACKS THAN IN THE PAST. CANG SAID GVN FORCES KNOW ALL THE INFILTRATION ROUTES INTO THE CITY, HOWEVER, AND CAN CONTROL THE SITUATION IF SURROUNDING PROVINCES HOLD WELL. TIEN SAID HIS RF ARE USING NEW TACTICS CONCENTRATING ON THE NVA/VC LOC'S TO SAIGON WITH ENCOURAGING SUCCESS.

4. CANG THOUGHT THE NVA/VC WOULD NOT ATTEMPT INDISCRIMINATE TERRORISM IN THE SAIGON AREA BUT RATHER WOULD TRY TO STRIKE HIGHLY SELECTIVE TARGETS. HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT THE AREA AROUND THE CAPITAL WOULD BE AS HEAVILY TARGETED AS THE CITY ITSELF AND WOULD CONCENTRATE HEAVILY ON ASSASSINATION OF LOCAL OFFICIALS AND PSDF TO UNDERMINE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE GVN'S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN CONTROL. THE GIA DINH PROVINCE CHIEF, WHOM I SAW LATER, HAD A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT VIEW. HE THOUGHT THE COMMUNISTS WOULD ATTEMPT TERRORIST ACTS ON A LESS SELECTIVE BASIS IN THE CITY EMPLOYING, IF POSSIBLE, UP TO SQUAD-SIZE ELEMENTS NOT ONLY TO ASSASSINATE POLITICAL LEADERS BUT ALSO TO STRIKE AT POLICE STATIONS, MILITARY HQS AND INSTALLATIONS, POST OFFICES AND OTHER GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS. BOTH AGREED THAT ROCKETING OF TAN SON NHUT AND THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE CITY WAS QUITE POSSIBLE BUT QUESTIONED WHETHER ROCKETS COULD REACH THE INNER CITY AREAS. BOTH REPORTED THE RECENT CAPTURE OF SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITIES OF SUCH COMMANDO-TYPE WEAPONS AS PISTOLS AND SNIPER RIFLES WITH SCOPES AND SILENCERS.

5. BOTH CANG AND TIEN SAID THERE IS CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC APPREHENSION  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SAIGON 01170 310628Z

OVER THE SECURITY SITUATION AFTER THE LOSS OF PHUOC LONG AND BA DEN MOUNTAIN. THEY ALSO SAID THAT THE NVA/VC ATTEMPT TO CAPITALIZE ON THIS PUBLIC CONCERN WITH THE CURRENT SCARE-RUMOR AND LEAFLET DISTRIBUTION PSYCHOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN WAS HAVING A MEASURE OF SUCCESS. THEY FELT, HOWEVER, THAT PUBLIC CONCERN WOULD ABATE IN TIME AS THE PEOPLE BECOME MORE ACCUSTOMED TO THE FACT OF THOSE LOSSES AND AS THE GVN SHOWS THAT IT IS ABLE TO DEFEND THE IMPORTANT PLACES. BOTH RECOGNIZED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE NVA/VC MIGHT BE ABLE TO CARRY

OFF SOME TERRORIST ACT IN THE CITY AREA AROUND TET BUT BOTH WERE CONFIDENT THAT IT COULD NOT BE ON THE SCALE SUGGESTED BY CURRENT NVA/VC RUMORS. TIEN THOUGHT THE NVA/VC WOULD SAVE THEIR HIGH POINT FOR SOME TIME AFTER TET.

6. ON OTHER MATTERS, CANG AND TIEN BOTH THOUGHT THAT THE PROTEST AGITATION OF FATHER THANH AND OTHERS IN RECENT MONTHS HAD ENHANCED PUBLIC APPREHENSION OVER SECURITY. THEY WERE IN AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, THAT FATHER THANH'S MOVEMENT IS ON THE WANE FOR LACK OF ANY BORAD SUPPORT. THEY OBSERVED SEPARATELY THAT NEITHER FATHER THANH NOR ANY REPRESENTATIVE HAD BEEN INVITED TO THE RECENT BUDDHIST CONGRESS IN SAIGON. THOUGH IN FACT NOT INVITED, FATHER THANH WAS MOVED TO DECLARE PUBLICLY THAT HE COULD NOT ATTEND THE CONGRESS BECAUSE OF SICKNESS.

7. COL TIEN SAID THAT THE ADSA PROGRAM HAD BEEN EXTREMELY SUCCESSFUL AND A REAL BOON FOR THE STABILITY OF GIA DINH URBAN AREAS. HE CONSIDERS CONTINUATION OF ADSA ACTIVITY ESSENTIAL PENDING SOME PERMANENT IMPROVEMENT IN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. SIGNED PETERS  
END QUOTE LEHMANN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, POLITICAL SITUATION, COMBAT OPERATIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 31 JAN 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975SAIGON01170  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750035-0991  
**From:** SAIGON  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t1975012/aaaaabmb.tel  
**Line Count:** 135  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION EA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 19 MAY 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <19 MAY 2003 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <20 MAY 2003 by GolinoFR>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** CONVERSATIONS WITH CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT COMMANDER AND GIA DINH PROVINCE CHIEF ABOUT  
**TAGS:** PINS, VS, (CHUNG DAN CANG), (CAU VAN TIEN)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006